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Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal policies, namely 
spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in 
recessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political 
distortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Voters 
have incentives similar to the "starving the Leviathan" classic argument, and demand more 
public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the 
economy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations based 
purely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success. 
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 1 Introduction
Most economists would agree with the normative prescription that tax rates
and discretionary government spending as a fraction of GDP ought to remain
constant over the business cycle. If governments respected these prescrip-
tions, we should observe a counter-cyclical pattern in ¯scal policy. Namely,
during a boom: (i) government spending as a share of GDP should go down
because of automatic stabilizers (if discretionary spending remained constant
in real terms, the e®ect would be reinforced); (ii) with constant tax rates and
some degree of progressivity, government revenues as a share of GDP should
go up (the e®ect would be reinforced by tax cuts in recessions and tax in-
creases in boom.); (iii) as a result, budget surpluses as a share of GDP should
increase. The opposite should occur in recessions.1
In practice, in many developing countries ¯scal policy has the opposite
properties: it is procyclical. In particular, government spending as a share of
GDP goes up during booms and down in recessions, while de¯cits increase in
booms and decrease in recessions. In OECD countries, instead, ¯scal policy is
generally counter-cyclical.2 Gavin and Perotti (1997) were the ¯rst to point
out that in Latin America ¯scal policy is procyclical, but Talvi and Vegh
(2005), Catao and Sutton (2002) and Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004)
noted that this is not a Latin American phenomenon only: procyclicality of
¯scal policy is common in many { though not all { developing countries.
Why do many countries follow seemingly sub optimal procyclical ¯scal
policies that add to macro economic instability? A common answer has to
do with the supply of credit. In bad times many developing countries cannot
borrow, or can do so only at very high interest rates, therefore they cannot
run de¯cits and have to cut spending; in booms they can borrow more easily
and choose to do so, increasing public spending (cf. Gavin and Perotti 1997,
1In light of the careful discussion of Kaminski, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) we want to
be clear regarding our choice of words. We de¯ne as counter-cyclical a policy that follows
the tax smoothing principle of holding constant tax rates and discretionary government
spending as a fraction of GDP over the cycle. They de¯ne such policy as \acyclical". Both
we and they would de¯ne as procyclical a policy in which tax rates go down in booms and
up in recessions and spending over GDP goes up in booms. As those authors themselves
note, our de¯nition is the most common in the literature.
2Some countries belonging to both groups have accumulated large amounts of public
debt. For a review of models that explain excessive de¯cits, see Alesina and Perotti (1995)
and Persson and Tabellini (2000). On the cyclical property of ¯scal policy in OECD
countries see Perotti (2004)
2Catao and Sutton 2001 and Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh 2004).
This argument is incomplete, however, since it begs two critical ques-
tions. First, why don't these countries self-insure by accumulating reserves
in good times, so that they are less likely to face binding credit constraints in
recessions? Second, why would lenders not provide funds to countries even
in recessions, if they were convinced that the borrowing would optimally
smooth out the cycle?
To answer both questions one needs to consider the political arena, and
this is what we do in this paper. We argue that procyclical and myopic
¯scal policy stems from a political agency problem. Voters face corrupt gov-
ernments that can appropriate part of tax revenues for unproductive public
consumption, i.e. political rents. Rents can be thought of as direct appro-
priation (stealing) of tax revenues by government o±cials, but also favors
paid to special interests such as public employees or \friends" of the govern-
ment, often identi¯ed along ethnic, or religious lines etc. Voters can replace
a government that abuses of his powers, but in equilibrium they generally
cannot push rents all the way to zero. This agency problem interacts with
lack of information: voters observe the state of the economy, but they cannot
observe government borrowing, at least not at the margin; for instance, the
government can accumulate hidden o®-balance-sheet liabilities. Hence, when
voters see the economy booming, they demand higher utility for themselves
(in the form of lower taxes, or better public goods), in a way that resem-
bles the \starve the Leviathan" argument. This forces the government to
impart a procyclical bias to ¯scal policy, and to borrow too much. Thus,
procyclical and myopic ¯scal policy (i.e. an increase in government spend-
ing during booms and excessive government borrowing) arises from voters'
demands { note that voters do not demand irrational policies, they are just
poorly informed about economic policy. They demand and obtain, through a
reelection constraint on the government, a second-best solution to an agency
problem in an environment of corruption and imperfect information. For-
mally, the model extends to a dynamic environment with public debt a model
of moral hazard and political accountability originally formulated by Barro
(1973) and Ferejohn (1986), and adapted to public ¯nance by Persson and
Tabellini (2000).
We then take the theoretical predictions to the data. First, we con¯rm
previous evidence on the widespread procyclicality of ¯scal policy. This is
mainly due to government spending, that goes up in booms and down in
recession as a share of GDP. Second, we show a strong positive correlation
3between procyclicality and measures of corruption: more corrupt countries
display a more procyclical ¯scal policy. Third, the correlation between cor-
ruption and procyclicality is only or mainly present in democracies, con¯rm-
ing the theoretical idea that procyclicality emerges because voters try to hold
corrupt governments accountable. Finally, we ask how robust is the correla-
tion between corruption and procyclicality when also taking into account the
evidence on borrowing constraints. This is not easy, because more corrupt
governments might also face more binding credit constraints. As a result,
many of the same variables that in°uence political corruption are also likely
to a®ect the severity of borrowing constraints { indeed, corruption is highly
correlated with credit ratings in the data. Nevertheless, we present some
suggestive evidence that political agency problems in democracies, rather
than credit market imperfections, are the underlying cause of procyclical ¯s-
cal policy. Our main conclusion is that procyclicality of ¯scal policy results
from a government failure, not a market failure, and takes place irrespective
of whether or not the government is up against a credit limit. Fiscal policy
is procyclical because rational but uninformed voters \starve the Leviathan"
and demand more in good times than in bad times.
We are not the ¯rst to suggest a political explanation to the procyclicality
of ¯scal policy. In Talvi and Vegh (2005), the presence of surpluses increases
the government propensity to spend; this distortion is assumed, however,
rather than derived from an explicit political model. An alternative po-
litical explanation is the \voracity e®ect" of Tornell and Lane (1999) and
Lane and Tornell (1998): when more resources are available (i.e. in booms),
the common pool problem is more severe and the ¯ght over common re-
sources intensi¯es, leading to budget de¯cits. But we do not know of other
papers that link ¯scal myopia and procyclicality to a political agency prob-
lem.3 Finally, the idea that voters induce debt accumulation to discipline
governments that they do no trust is related to Jensen and Meckling (1976).
That seminal contribution shows that debt ¯nancing (as opposed to external
equity ¯nancing) can mitigate the agency problem inside the ¯rm; but of
course, the mechanism through which this happens in our political context
is di®erent.
Our idea that political agency can lead to excessive debt accumulation
3Satyanath and Subramanian (2004) show empirical evidence that democratic failure
explains macroeconomic instability; but they focus on the distinction between democra-
cies vs non-democracies, whereas we argue that procyclical ¯scal policy stems from the
interaction of democratic accountability and political corruption.
4when voters are uninformed di®ers from two other political models of govern-
ment borrowing in the literature. The strategic debt argument (Alesina and
Tabellini (1990), Persson and Svensson (1989), Tabellini and Alesina (1990))
does not rely on an agency problem: voters are not uninformed about ¯scal
policy and the results are driven by di®erent preferences amongst political
parties or groups of voters. In the rational budget cycles literature (Ro-
go® and Siebert (1989) and Rogo® (1990)), voters face an adverse selection
problem and this leads to distorted ¯scal policy before the election. The
assumption about voters' information is similar to ours, but here the incen-
tive problem is one of moral hazard, not adverse selection. Moreover, those
papers do not discuss the reaction of economic policy to external shocks, nor
do they allow for a state variable like government debt.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay out the model.
In section 3 we derive the economic and political equilibrium. Section 4
discusses the empirical evidence; the last section concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The economy
Consider a small open economy with an in¯nite horizon. The private sec-
tor consists of a representative consumer that maximizes the presented dis-






where ct denotes consumption in period t;E is the expectations operator,
and u(¢) is a smooth and strictly concave increasing function. For simplicity,
we neglect the economic choices of the private sector, and only focus on
its political role of controlling the government agency problem. Thus, we
assume that private consumption in each period is just given by endowment
income (y) net of taxes (¿): ct = yt ¡ ¿t: The model is meaningful only
if government debt is non-neutral and this is the simplest way to get that
property. Income is an i.i.d. random variable, drawn each period from a
distribution with bounded support over [y; ¹ y]. All variables are expressed in
5per capita terms.4
Government spending in period t only takes the form of (non-negative)
rents, rt ¸ 0, that bene¯t the government but not the consumer. Adding pro-
ductive government spending would complicate the notation without chang-
ing the results: for all practical purposes, we can think of u(ct) as the utility
accruing to the private sector from private and public consumption, and of ¿t
as the additional taxes needed to pay for unproductive spending that bene¯ts
the government but not the consumers at large.
In period t the government can issue public debt, bt+1; at a market price
¯: Government debt is bought by foreign residents and there is full repayment
of debt next period.5 Thus, exploiting the government budget constraint, we
can write private consumption in period t as:
ct = yt ¡ rr + ¯bt+1 ¡ bt (2)
We assume that there is a limit to how much resources a government
can appropriate for his own exclusive bene¯t: rt · Rt. The upper bound
Rt denotes what the government can steal from the public co®ers without
ending up in jail. We consider two alternative assumptions about Rt: In
the simplest case, it is a constant: Rt = ¹ r: Alternatively, we assume that
the upper bound on rents is a decreasing and concave function of public
debt outstanding: Rt = R(bt); with Rb < 0; Rbb < 0. Thus, if the previous
legislature accumulated a large amount of government debt, there is less room
to steal today. As discussed in the next subsection, debt is only observed
by the public at large in the subsequent period, when it has to be repaid.
Thus, this second assumption says that, if the government accumulated large
liabilities in the previous legislature, it is under more careful scrutiny today,
both from the domestic voters and international organizations, and as a result
the upper bound on rents is more severe. As we shall see, the assumption
that there is an upper bound on rents plays a role even if this constraint
is not binding in equilibrium, because it determines the strength of out-of-
equilibrium threats. But the policy response to income shocks is the same
4Alternative but more complicated assumptions would be to allow the consumer to
borrow or lend in an economy with tax distortions, or to model explicitly a liquidity
constraint on private consumption.
5The assumption of a small open economy is appropriate for our empirical work, in
which we consider this kind of countries. Without default risk there is no risk premium,
but in our empirical analysis we allow for the e®ects of risk premia on government-issued
liabilities.
6irrespective of whether the upper bound Rt is a constant or a function of
debt outstanding.
Finally, we assume that government debt can be issued only up to a
maximum amount ¹ b: Up to this amount, debt is always repaid in full and
there is no default risk nor any credit market imperfection. This upper limit
on government debt is low enough (compared to the possible realizations of
per capita income), so that the non-negativity constraints on consumption
and rents are not violated in equilibrium:
y
¹
¡¹ b > ¹ r (3)
R(¹ b) > 0 (4)
The ¯rst inequality guarantees that, even if the upper bound on rents is a
constant and income is lowest, outstanding debt can always be repaid in full
without pushing private consumption to zero. The second inequality implies
there is always something to steal, even if the upper bound on rents is a
decreasing function of debt, and debt is maximal: These assumptions play
no role, other than to make sure that the equilibrium does not violate some
non-negativity constraints.
In this simple environment, the optimal policy for the voters is of course
rt = 0 and a debt policy that smooths private consumption in the face
of income shocks. Such a policy would typically induce the consumer to
spend only a fraction of any income increase, since by assumption income is
i.i.d. and hence income increases are temporary. Conversely, negative income
shocks would lead to some debt accumulation and consumption would fall
less than one for one with income.
2.2 The political system
Elections are held at the end of each period. The incumbent government






where it is understood that he can get rents only while in o±ce (if the in-
cumbent is not reappointed, then future political rents will be enjoyed by
another politician in o±ce). The utility function v(¢) is smooth, increasing
and strictly concave.
7The political environment is adapted from Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986)
and Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 4). Speci¯cally, government policy is
chosen after the elections, by the incumbent, and there is no commitment to
electoral promises. Thus, there is an element of \contract incompleteness" in
the political environment, and the government can only be held accountable
ex-post through backward-looking voting strategies. This accountability is
made possible by assuming that, at each election, the incumbent is challenged
by an identical opponent, whose role is to provide an alternative. Voters
choose the optimal voting strategy that minimizes their loss of welfare from
this agency problem. Relative to the models of Ferejohn (1986) and Persson
and Tabellini (2000), we have added government debt. This makes the model
truly dynamic, while the previous literature on political agency had static
economic environments.
Voters observe their own current utility as well as their income (and hence
how much they are paying in taxes). But they do not observe how much gov-
ernment debt is being accumulated in the current period. This is equivalent
to saying that the government can incur o®-balance-sheet liabilities with
which to pay for rents. The size of these liabilities only becomes known to
the voters after the elections. This assumption is consistent with the vast lit-
erature that has emphasized the size and signi¯cance of creative accounting
and lack of transparency of the budget especially in developing countries; it
has the same °avor of the information assumptions of the literature or ratio-
nal political business and budget cycles.6 Note how an ex post \discovery"
of large government liabilities may trigger more control over the government
and therefore make it more di±cult for the government to appropriate rents
in the future, which is one of the cases we examine below.
Thus, the sequence of events is as follows: (i) At the start of each period,
before government policy is chosen, voters observe their income before taxes
in the current periods, yt; and debt outstanding, bt; they select a reservation
6See in particular Von Hagen and Harden(1994), Alesina and Perotti (1995), Milesi
Ferretti (2003), amongst others, on the role of lack of transparency in the budget process,
and Rogo® (1990), Rogo® and Siebert (1990) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for rational
political cycles. Note that there is an asymmetry: while voters do not observe bt+1 until
period t + 1; foreign lenders do not lend to the government past the point ¹ b ; hence
international ¯nancial markets have better information about the debt policy compared
to national voters. Qualitatively, this assumption is not implausible, although here for
simplicty it is formulated in a very stark form: voters are totally ignorant, while foreign
investors are perfectly informed. As we shall see, however, the upper bound ¹ b plays no
role in the case in which the ceiling on rents is a function of debt outstanding: Rt = R(bt):
8level of private consumption, c¤
t, and promise re-election to the incumbent
conditional on attaining at least that level of consumption. (ii) The gov-
ernment observes the reservation level demanded by voters as well as their
current income, and sets policy for the current period, namely rents (rt) and
government debt (bt+1). (iii) Voters observe their utility from private con-
sumption and vote according to their promise This sequence of events is
repeated in each period.
An equilibrium is a reservation level of private consumption that is op-
timal for the voters in the current period, given the initial conditions and
taking into account subsequent equilibrium outcomes, and a policy that is
optimal for the government, given the voting strategy and subsequent equi-
librium outcomes. Note that this de¯nition of sequential equilibrium rules
out pre-commitment by the voters to a sequence of voting rules. Voters can
punish the government for bad behavior during the current legislature. But
we do not allow voters to punish the government for the policy chosen before
the previous election, once they discover how much public debt was accumu-
lated during the previous legislature. In other words, we restrict attention to
Markov-perfect equilibria. Since the government is fully informed and there
is no asymmetric information, rational voters can fully predict government
policy, even if they do not observe it. Hence, in equilibrium no government
change occurs and the incumbent is always re-elected, although the threat
of out of equilibrium events is a major determinant of the voters' and of the
government's decisions.
3 Equilibrium policies
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium and then we discuss its prop-
erties. Since it is simpler, we start with the case in which the upper bound
on rents is a constant irrespective of public debt outstanding: Rt = ¹ r. The
appendix describes the equilibrium under the alternative assumption that
Rt = R(bt). Suppose that the incumbent chooses to forgo re-election. In
this case, he will certainly grab as many rents as possible, and obtain utility
v(Rt) = v(¹ r).7
7Under our assumptions, government debt policy in this out-of-equilibrium outcome is
not well de¯ned (in the sense that the government is indi®erent about bt+1). But we don't
need to specify the out-of-equilibrium debt to determine the equilibrium outcome, so we
leave it at that.
9Next, suppose that the incumbent government seeks to please the voters.
Let W(b;y;c) be the incumbent's maximal utility in this case, given current
income y, debt outstanding b, and voters demands c. Let a 0 in front of a
variable denote next period values. Then W(b;y;c) is de¯ned by:
W(b;y;c) = Max
r;b0 [v(r) + ¯EV (b
0;y
0)] (5)
subject to the budget constraint, r = y¡c+¯b0¡b and to the upper bounds
on rents and government debt. The function V (¢) is the equilibrium value of
reappointment for the incumbent, in the future state (b0;y0):
The incumbent can always choose to forego re-election. Hence, voters
cannot push government utility below the threshold v(¹ r) (what he can achieve
by grabbing maximal rents once). In other words, for any values of b and y,
voters' demands have to satisfy the following incentive constraint:
W(b;y;c) ¸ v(¹ r) (6)
Clearly, it is optimal for the voters to demand private consumption up to the
point where (6) holds as equality. Not doing that would simply enable the
government to grab more rents for itself, without increasing voters' utility in
current and future periods. Hence, equilibrium demands by the voters, c¤,
are a function c¤ = C(b;y), de¯ned implicitly by the condition:
W(b;y;c
¤) = v(¹ r) (7)
We can then de¯ne the equilibrium value of reappointment, namely the
function V (b;y) introduced above, as:
V (b;y) = W(b;y;c
¤) = v(¹ r) (8)
where the last equality follows by (7).
Since (8) must hold for any values of b and y; it must also hold in all future
periods. Thus, V (b0;y0) = v(¹ r) for all possible values of y0 and b0: Based on
(5) and (8), equilibrium rents in the current period are then implicitly de¯ned
by the following condition:
v(r) + ¯v(¹ r) = v(¹ r) (9)
The left hand side of (9) is the incumbent's utility if he pleases the voters,
given the equilibrium continuation value of being reappointed tomorrow. The
10right hand side is his utility if he steals as much as possible today, but is
then thrown out of o±ce. In equilibrium, the incumbent must be indi®erent




¡1 [v(¹ r)(1 ¡ ¯)] (10)
It remains to determine optimal public debt, b0, for a government seeking
re-appointment. Using the previous notation, this is the solution to the
following optimization problem:
Max
b0 [(y ¡ c
¤ + ¯b
0 ¡ b) + ¯EV (b
0;y
0)] (11)
subject to b0 · ¹ b: The expression inside the round brackets corresponds to
rents in the current period, given the voters equilibrium request, c¤: The last
term is the expected equilibrium continuation value (i.e. what the govern-
ment expects to get from next period onwards if he is re-appointed).
By the argument above, EV (b0;y0) = v(¹ r) for any value of b0. This means
that, from the perspective of a government seeking reappointment, issuing
public debt in the current period entails no future costs. The costs are
fully borne by the consumers. But by assumption, consumers do not observe
government debt. Hence, the incumbent can pocket the proceeds from issuing
government debt in the form of higher rents. Indeed, the optimal debt policy
that solves (11) is to always borrow as much as possible: b0¤ = ¹ b. Equilibrium
private consumption is then easily obtained by inserting all these results in
the budget constraint, (2).
We summarize all this in the following:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the upper bound on rents is a constant, Rt = ¹ r.
Then the equilibrium stochastic steady state has:
c




¡1 [v(¹ r)(1 ¡ ¯)]
b
¤ = ¹ b
The steady state is reached after one period.
The appendix solves the case in which the upper bound on rents depends
on debt outstanding: Rt = R(bt). The solution procedure is very similar,
8Implictly, we are assuming that equilibrium rents are strictly positive.
11the only di®erence being that issuing government debt now is costly for the
government, because it reduces the value of its out-of-equilibrium threat
next period. As a result, equilibrium debt is now at an interior optimum
lower than the upper bound ¹ b; and the steady state is reached gradually
rather than at once. But throughout the adjustment to the steady state,
and once the steady state is reached, consumption moves one for one with
income. Equilibrium debt and rents are not a®ected by income shocks. More
speci¯cally, the appendix proves:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the upper bound on rents depends on debt out-
standing, Rt = R(bt). Then the equilibrium stochastic steady state has:
c






and steady state debt is at an interior optimum b¤ < ¹ b: Under the conditions
stated in the appendix, the steady state is locally stable. During the adjust-
ment to the steady state, income shocks only a®ect consumption, that changes
one for one with income.
3.1 Discussion
According to Propositions 1 and 2, income shocks change consumption one
for one: positive income shocks are not saved through the government budget
to bring about higher utility for tomorrow; and negative income shocks do not
lead to more government borrowing. This happens irrespective of whether
the government is up against its debt ceiling or not. This failure to smooth
income shocks with ¯scal policy is due to an agency problem, not to a credit
market imperfection. The intuition is straightforward: consumers do not
observe debt accumulation. They also know that they cannot trust the
government. Thus, when they see better macroeconomic conditions, they
demand higher utility for themselves. If they did not do that, the government
would simply appropriate more rents, and they would not receive any higher
consumption in the future anyway. The converse happens when income is
seen to go down.
To keep the model simple, here the government can only deliver utility
to the voters through tax cuts. Thus, literally the model predicts that the
tax revenue to GDP ratio goes down in booms and up in recessions. But
12as already noted, it would be easy to add productive government spending
to the model (that also yields utility to the voters). In such a case, during
an economic boom voters would demand both higher private and public
consumption. Depending on the speci¯c assumptions, either government
spending would go up or tax rates would go down when income increases,
or both. But either way, voters would demand immediate welfare gains, and
would not trust the government to save resources for the future.
Finally, note that in the model as we have it written, the degree of "cor-
ruption" is a zero-one variable: either the government can appropriate rents,
in which case ¯scal policy is procyclical, or it cannot, in which case ¯scal
policy is optimal. This stark contrast comes form the strong assumptions on
government preferences. We also solved a two-period version of this model
with a relative weight capturing how much the government cares about rents
relative to consumer welfare. In such a model, the degree of procyclicality
is a function of the weight given to consumer welfare: the more government
cares about rents, the larger is the reaction of private consumption to in-




The model of the previous sections explains procyclical ¯scal policy as the
result of a political agency problem. Voters do not trust the government,
and demand higher utility (in the form of lower taxes or higher productive
government spending) when they see aggregate output going up. Thus, the
model predicts that procyclical ¯scal policy should mainly be observed in
countries where political corruption is widespread. In countries where the
government is subject to checks and balances, and political rents are negligi-
ble or di±cult to capture, voters have no reason to mistrust the government
and impart a procyclical bias to ¯scal policy. Moreover, procyclical ¯scal
policy results from a corrupt government which is nevertheless accountable
to the voters. If the government were totally unaccountable (say in a stable
dictatorship), then corruption would be high but voters could not in°uence
what the government does, and hence the procyclical bias should not be
observed or be less prevalent.
13To take these predictions to the data, we estimate a cross-country regres-
sion of the following type:
Betai = Á0 + Á1Control of corruptioni + Á2Xi + ui (12)
where the i subscript denotes countries, the dependent variable, Beta, is a
measure of counter-cyclicality in ¯scal policy, the variable Control of corruption
is a measure of (the absence of) political corruption, and X denotes other
control variables described below. The coe±cient of interest is Á1, which we
expect to be positive: ¯scal policy is more counter-cyclical when there is less
corruption. Moreover, we expect Á1 to be positive in democracies, but not
in dictatorships: corruption imparts a procyclical bias in democracies (where
the government is accountable to the voters), but not in dictatorships (where
accountability is not an issue).
Finally, it is not obvious that the relationship between political corruption
and procyclicality in ¯scal policy is linear and continuous (a tiny amount of
more corruption leads to slightly more procyclicality). On the contrary, the
version of the model which we presented implies that there are two groups
of countries: those where political checks and balances are not working well
and corruption is rampant, and those to which this does not apply. The
former is more likely to be the case in less developed economies, given the
well known positive correlation between quality of institutions and per capita
income. In fact, previous studies have shown that procyclical ¯scal policy
is a big problem in some developing countries, but not among industrial
democracies (cf. Kaminski, Reinhart and Vegh 2004). To allow for a non-
linear relationship between corruption and procyclicality in ¯scal policy, we
also estimate a probit version of (12), where the dependent variable is 1 if
Betai > 0 (counter-cyclical ¯scal policy) and 0 if Betai < 0 (procyclical
¯scal policy). Thus, we estimate the probability of observing procyclical
¯scal policy in country i: The regressors are the same regressors that appear
on the right hand side of (12).
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Cyclicality of ¯scal policy
We construct a measure of cyclicality of ¯scal policy following Catao and
Sutton (2002), who in turn adapt Gavin and Perotti's (1997) speci¯cation.
14Our measure of procyclicality is the coe±cient ¯ from the following re-
gression estimated separately for each country in the sample (t subscripts
denote years):
¢St = ® + ¯GDPGAPt + °TOTt + µSt¡1 + "t (13)
where: St refers to the central government's overall budget surplus as a per-
centage of GDP(obtained from the World Bank's Global Development Net-
work Growth Database (GDNGD), based on data originally from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund's Government Financial Statistics); GDPGAPt is
the output gap, de¯ned as the log deviation of GDP from its Hodrik-Prescott
trend; TOTt is a measure of the gap in terms of trade, also de¯ned as the
logarithmic deviation from a Hodrick-Prescott-¯ltered series. The source for
the GDP and terms of trade series is the World Development Indicators
(WDI). A negative coe±cient on GDPGAP implies that a cyclical boom is
associated with a decrease in the budget surplus, meaning that the behavior
of ¯scal policy is procyclical. We also consider the same speci¯cation but
rede¯ne the dependent variable as either spending or tax revenue as a share
of GDP, rather than the budget surplus. In choosing the speci¯cation for our
computation of procyclicality we had to be parsimonious, to have as large a
sample of countries as possible. We have data on 87 countries, in a sample
that goes from 1960 to 1999 but, despite the parsimonious speci¯cation, only
for a small number of countries we have data for the whole period, with a
few countries having as little as ¯ve years of data. As a robustness check, we
have also run the regressions limiting the sample to those countries with at
least ten years of data, and the results are similar.
Table 1 reports our estimate of the parameter ¯ in our 87 countries; the
¯scal policy variable in the left hand side of (13) is the budget surplus. Our
estimates con¯rm previous results by others. In the OECD countries ¯scal
policy is countercyclical: in all but three countries the coe±cient beta has
the correct (i.e. positive sign) and so does the average ¯ for the OECD. In
36 out of 64 non-OECD countries in the sample the coe±cient ¯ has the
incorrect sign (i.e. it is negative). The two regions with the most procyclical
¯scal policy are Sub-Saharan Africa and (especially) Latin America, which
is the \worst" region. This is in fact the region that had originally attracted
the interest of economists about procyclicality of ¯scal policy (see Gavin and
Perotti (1997), for instance). Note that most countries in Eastern Europe
have very few years of observations, so results on this region have to be taken
15cum grano salis.9
Table 2 reports the ¯ coe±cient obtained in regressions where on the left
hand side of (13) we have spending and tax revenues as a percentage of GDP.
Here, procyclicality corresponds to ¯ > 0 for expenditures, and ¯ < 0 for
revenues. In OECD countries most of the counter-cyclical \action" is on the
spending side. In Latin America both the spending side and the revenue
side are procyclical, with the size of the spending side being twice as large in
absolute value. In Sub-Saharan Africa all the procyclicality comes from the
spending side. Thus, in these two regions which are especially procyclical
the \incorrect" timing of ¯scal policy seems to be driven almost exclusively
by spending.
Many of the ¯ coe±cients have large standard errors and are not signif-
icantly di®erent from zero. However, in OECD countries the positive coe±-
cients in the surplus regression and the negative one on spending are almost
all signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. In Latin American and Sub-Saharan
Africa several of the coe±cients with the wrong sign are statistically dif-
ferent from zero, but a majority of the coe±cients in non-OECD countries
are not statistically di®erent from zero. To cope with likely measurement
error, below we also report regressions were we weight observations with the
(inverse of) the estimated standard errors of the ¯ coe±cients.
4.2.2 Control of corruption
To measure the degree of corruption, we use the Control of Corruption index
from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi's (2004) aggregate governance indica-
tors, which aggregates several scores and ratings from di®erent sources on a
scale of ¡2:5 to 2:5. This index is decreasing in the amount of corruption
and it is available for 1996, 1998, and 2000, and we take the average of the
three years. We repeated the exercise using data on perceptions from cor-
ruption from ICRG (available for the whole period years 1982-97) and from
Transparency International (available from 1996 onward). The results were
9We have dropped from our sample two outlier countries: Israel and Yemen. These
countries have coe±cients that exceed 1 in absolute value (Israel negative, Yemen posi-
tive). Note that Israel is a country with relatively low corruption and a very procyclical
¯scal policy (according to the estimated coe±cient). Therefore excluding Israel would help
¯nding the relationship between procyclicality and corruption derived from the model. The
same applies to Yemen in the opposite direction. Including both countries in our sample
does not a®ect the results.
16very similar, since these corruption indicators are highly correlated with each
other and move slowly over time. In the end, we only report results using
the Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004) data, since they are available for
a larger number of countries.
4.2.3 Other regressors
We also control for other regressors that may determine the cyclical response
of ¯scal policy (the variable X in (12)). To allow for di®erences in the level
of economic development, we control for real per capita income; we measure
it as real GDP per capita in international prices (PPP adjusted) in the ¯rst
year of the sample over which the measure of procyclicality of ¯scal policy is
computed for each country. The source is the WDI. This variable is called
Initial GDP (per capita). To capture how democratic a country is, we rely on
the variable Polity2, which subtracts the country's score in an "Autocracy"
index from its score in a "Democracy" index (resulting in a range from ¡10
to 10), from the Polity IV Project database. We average this variable over
the sample used to compute the ¯scal policy measure, and use the result to
construct two di®erent measures: a coarser Democracy dummy, which equals
one if the average Polity2 score is strictly positive, and zero otherwise; and
the average Polity2 measure itself.
The cyclical properties of ¯scal policy may di®er across countries because
the size of government spending is di®erent. Hence we also control for this
feature of a country's public sector, with a variable Government size de¯ned
as the share of central government's expenditure in real GDP, also from the
GDNGD.
Finally, as others have noted (e.g. Gavin and Perotti 1997), procyclical
¯scal policy may also result from tight credit constraints. We make use of two
variables to proxy for the degree of ¯nancial constraints facing a country's
government. One of them is an average of the existing sample of ratings at-
tributed by Standard & Poor's to a country's long-term foreign-denominated
sovereign debt (S&P Rating).10 We interpret this average as an inverse mea-
10Adapting Cantor and Packer's (1996) approach, we attribute numbers from 0 to 6 to
S&P's letter-based system: C (default or selective default); B (high-risk obligations); BB
(likely to ful¯ll obligations, ongoing uncertainty); BBB (adequate payment capacity); A
(strong payment capacity); AA (high quality); AAA (highest quality). Countries rated at
BBB or better are said to have "investment-grade" ratings.
Since changes in ratings occur at irregular intervals, we computed the average by weigh-
17sure of the degree of ¯nancial constraints facing a country's government. The
other variable is the logarithm of the spread (in basis points) of a country's
sovereign debt over U.S. Treasury bonds at the time of issuance (Spread),
which comes from Capital Data Bondware and SDC Platinum.11 This con-
stitutes a direct measure of ¯nancial constraints. It should be noted that
both of these variables are limited in terms of the number of countries in
our sample for which they are available (70 and 47, respectively) and of the
period over which they are available: for most countries the sample starts in
the 1990s, which means that, unlike the democracy variables, the average is
not taken over the sample used to compute the ¯scal policy variable.
4.3 Procyclicality and corruption
We now examine the correlation between the cyclical properties of ¯scal pol-
icy and political corruption. Table 3 reports some simple statistics. Latin
America and Sub-Saharan Africa have the lowest score on control of corrup-
tion and they are the most procyclical regions.
Table 4 presents some multivariate regressions estimated by OLS. The
dependent variable is the estimated beta coe±cient on the budget surplus
reported in Table 1. Columns 1 and 2 show a strongly signi¯cant relationship
between Control of corruption and procyclicality: more corrupt countries are
more procyclical, even after controlling for initial GDP per capita in log (col-
umn 2).12 Column 3 shows that the estimated coe±cient on the variable
Democracy is not statistically signi¯cant, but Column 4 highlights the inter-
action between Democracy and Control of corruption: when the two variables
are interacted, the estimated coe±cient on corruption alone drops and be-
comes statistically insigni¯cant, while the interaction term has a positive and
signi¯cant estimated coe±cient (of about the same size as the coe±cient of
corruption alone in Column 3). Thus, the e®ect of corruption on procyclical-
ity is apparent only among democracies, as predicted by the theory. Columns
ing a given rating by the ¯rst integer greater than the number of years over which it was
kept.
11Similarly to the case of ratings, the issuance of new debt occurs at irregular intervals.
We thus use a similar weighting system to compute the average spread, taking into account
the length of of the period between emissions.
12Initial GDP is more exogenous to cyclicality of ¯scal policy than per capita income
measured in the middle or at the end of the sample period. In any event, we repeated the
regressions using per capita income measured in the middle of the sample period available
for each country and the result are virtually unchanged.
185 and 6 repeat the same experiment using the continuous Polity2 variable to
measure democracy; the results are very similar.
We repeated all these regressions adding the variable Government size on
the right hand side, where this variable is averaged for the period in which
the left hand side is de¯ned. This new variable was never statistically sig-
ni¯cant, and the sign and signi¯cance of all the other estimated coe±cients
was unchanged relative to Table 4. We also ran these regressions excluding
Eastern European countries, where the number of observations available to
construct the beta coe±cients were relatively small. The results are qualita-
tively unchanged.13 In Table 5 we use the Probit method and we de¯ne the
left hand variable (beta) as a zero-one variable (1 if positive, zero if negative).
The results of this table con¯rm the previous one; if anything they make it
even clearer that the e®ect of corruption on procyclicality is present only in
democracies, a result consistent with the spirit of the model.
Our dependent variable (the estimated beta coe±cients) is likely to be
measured with error. Moreover, measurement error could vary across coun-
tries, and be larger in the countries where procyclicality is estimated from
a shorter time series. To cope with this problem, in Table 6 we estimate
the same speci¯cations as in Table 4, but we weight observations by the (in-
verse of) the standard error of the estimated ¯ coe±cients. The estimated
coe±cient on Control of corruption is now a bit smaller, but the pattern of
signi¯cance and the inferences we can draw remain the same as in Table 4.
Finally, Table 7 repeats the same exercise as in Table 4, but now the
dependent variable is the ¯ coe±cient estimated from government spending
regressions (and reported in Table 2). Here a positive ¯ denotes procyclical-
ity. Hence we expect Control of corruption to have the opposite sign as in
Table 4: more Control of corruption should be associated with less procycli-
cality, and hence we expect a negative coe±cient. This is indeed what we
¯nd. The pattern of signi¯cance is the same as in Table 4. In particular, the
e®ect of corruption on cyclicality of spending is stronger in democracies (the
interaction term between Democracy or Polity2 and Control of corruption
has a negative and signi¯cant estimated coe±cient). Here we also ¯nd that
the estimated coe±cient on the variable Democracy (or Polity2) in isolation
is positive and signi¯cant, suggesting that, aside from the interaction with
corruption, democratic government on its own leads to more countercyclical
government spending. This might also re°ect the composition of government
13All these results are available upon request.
19spending in democracies, that is likely to be more leaning towards social
insurance. Repeating the same experiment for the cyclicality of tax rev-
enues leads to inconclusive results. When the dependent variable is de¯ned
as the ¯ coe±cient on tax revenues in per cent of GDP, no robust pattern
of correlations emerges, and the R2 of the regression is of the order of 0.02:
essentially we cannot explain the observed patterns of cyclicality of tax rev-
enues. These results on taxation and spending suggest that the procyclicality
of ¯scal policy is driven by spending, not by taxation.
4.4 The role of borrowing constraints
The major alternative explanation of a procyclical ¯scal policy, di®erent from
our own, is that of borrowing constraints. If a country is credit rationed,
it can spend only in booms; moreover, in downturns the credit constraint
could become more binding and the government is forced to rein in ¯scal
policy. How can we discriminate between these two explanations, corruption
vs borrowing constraints?
The key di±culty in addressing this issue is that corruption and credit
ratings are very highly correlated. As shown in Table 8, the correlation
coe±cient between the variables S&P Rating and Control of corruption is
0.92. Control of corruption is also highly correlated with available data on
interest rate spreads (Spread), a correlation of -0.82. Needless to say the two
variable measuring credit rationing are highly correlated between each other
(-0.89). In fact, some of these variables are correlated by construction. For
instance Standard and Poor may look (directly or indirectly) to perception
of corruption as one of their input in assigning ratings to countries. And
perceptions of corruption may be in°uenced by foreigners' views of a country
credit worthiness. The credit variable and corruption are all correlated with
the expected sign with our measure of procyclicality.
The ¯rst observation relates to the results on the interaction between
democracy and corruption. As discussed in the previous subsection, the
correlation between corruption and procyclicality is stronger in democracies.
This is a direct implication of our model. To be also consistent with a borrow-
ing constraint story, corrupt democracies would have to be worst borrowers
than corrupt dictatorships (while less corrupt governments would be equally
trustworthy in democracies and autocracies). A priori one can think of many
reason why it might be the opposite, or at least why the interaction be-
tween democracy and corruption would not be relevant in determining credit
20worthiness.14
The second rough test we performed is the following. In Table 9 we
report the ¯ on the budget surplus estimated on two sub-samples: pre and
post 1982, the year of the Mexican debt crises that opened up two decades
of debt crises, defaults etc. It is fair to say that, before 1982, concerns about
default and credit worthiness were much less important than afterwards. In
general this table shows no evidence that procyclicality increased after 1982.
In fact the opposite seems to be the case; in Latin America and Sub-Saharan
Africa, the two most procyclical regions, we observe less procyclicality after
1982 than before. This seems rather inconsistent with a purely borrowing
costs story.
This interpretation is also con¯rmed by re-estimating the regressions of
procyclicality on corruption with the beta coe±cients estimated before 1982.
As shown in Table 10, Control of corruption retains a positive and statis-
tically estimated coe±cient even when the measure of cyclicality refers to
the pre-1982 period (although here the interaction between Democracy and
Control of corruption is no longer statistically signi¯cant). These regressions
ought to be interpreted with caution, both because cyclicality is likely to be
measured with error (the sample is rather short for many countries), and
because our measure of corruption refers to a rather distant period in time.
Nevertheless, these estimates suggest that the correlation between procycli-
cality and corruption is a robust feature that pre-dates the years of sovereign
debt crises.15
We have also added the measure of Standard & Poor's credit worthiness
into our basis regressions of Table 4. The results are displayed in Table 11.
In Column 1, where control of corruption and credit rating are introduced
together, they are both insigni¯cant given how highly correlated they are.
Column 2 however highlights a suggestive result: the interaction of Control
of corruption with democracy is still signi¯cant and positive even when we
control for the S&P Rating variable. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the same ex-
periments of Columns 1 and 2 with two other measure of democracy (Polity
14We repeated the same procedure using the probit speci¯cation for the left hand side
variable. The general picture of the results that we obtained is similar to the one presented
in the text.
15In all these regressions we have excluded the outliers of Israel and Yemen but none of
our result depend on including or excluding them. Also we have excluded any country with
fewer than 5 observations usable to compute the ¯ coe±cient. The variable Democracy
has been rede¯ned to correspond to the pre-1982 period.
212)with similar results. Columns 5 to 8 repeat the same regressions from
Columns 1 to 4 using the Spread measure of credit rating rather than the
S&P Rating variable. What we ¯nd here is that the Spread measure is statis-
tically signi¯cant but so is the interaction of democracy with the measure of
control of corruption. We have also repeated the same regressions weighting
observations by the (inverse of) the standard errors of the ¯ coe±cients, and
using the Probit method, obtaining similar results.
Note also that if credit constraints were the main cause of procyclicality,
the latter should be especially evident in recessions, when governments can-
not borrow and thus have to tax more or spend less in order to overcome
recession-induced de¯cits. In booms instead the governments have resources,
and not only can they be anticyclical (i.e. reduce spending as a share of
GDP or increase tax revenues as a share of GDP) but, expecting constraints
in recessions, they should be especially keen on accumulating surpluses in
booms; thus they should be especially anticyclical in booms. It turns out
that governments are more procyclical in booms than in recessions; in fact
in more than 2/3 of the countries that are procyclical they are more so in
booms than in recessions. This observation casts some doubts on a simple
borrowing constraint interpretation of procyclicality.
In fact, we have reestimated equation (13) separately for each country,
allowing the ¯ coe±cient to take on di®erent values in positive vs negative
output gaps. Our agency model predicts no asymmetry: there is no reason
why ¯scal policy ought to react very di®erently in booms vs recessions. Ac-
cording to the credit market imperfection hypothesis, instead, if anything
procyclicality should be stronger during recessions, as discussed above. Ta-
ble 12 lists the 39 countries with procyclical ¯scal policy (i.e. with negative
estimated ¯ coe±cients in Table 1). The ¯rst column (Beta Recession) re-
ports the estimated ¯ coe±cient during recessions; the second column (Beta
Boom) reports the estimated ¯ coe±cient during booms. Remember that
the beta coe±cients should be positive both in recessions (GDPGAP neg-
ative) and in booms (GDPGAP positive). In 21 out of 39 countries, Beta
Boom is negative and Beta Recession positive, indicating that only in booms
we observe procyclicality. Moreover in 28 out of 39 countries Beta Boom
is lower algebraically than Beta Recession: In other words, only in 11 out
of 39 countries procyclicality seems to be driven mostly by recession peri-
ods. Given the large standard errors, the di®erence between Beta Boom and
Beta Recession is almost never statistically signi¯cant, but nevertheless this
evidence is suggestive, since the credit constraint hypothesis would imply
22a signi¯cant di®erence in which procyclicality emerges especially or only in
recessions.
As a further check, in Table 13 we have regressed Beta Recession (i.e. the
reaction of the surplus to recessions) against our variables of interest. Ac-
cording to the credit market imperfection hypothesis, the variables measuring
credit constraints (S&P Rating and Spread) should have more explanatory
power in these regressions than against the overall measures of procyclicality,
and conversely the variable Control of corruption should have less explana-
tory power here: as argued above, credit market imperfections are more likely
to lead to distorted ¯scal policy at the time of recession than during booms.
But this is not what we ¯nd. In column 1, Control of corruption is generally
highly signi¯cant and with the expected sign. Columns 2 and 3 show that
also the measures of Spread and S&P Rating are signi¯cant, but the last
two columns show that when control of corruption and the credit market
variables are entered together the Control of Corruption variable dominates.
In column 4 it is the only one which is signi¯cant, in the last one it is bor-
derline insigni¯cant but much closer to signi¯cance that the credit constraint
variable.
In summary, it is di±cult to disentangle clearly the e®ects of credit con-
straints per se from political variables such as measure of corruption. How-
ever the tests presented above suggest at least tentatively that corruption
and political imperfections play a major role in explaining procyclicality of
¯scal policy, and perhaps more so than credit constraints.
5 Conclusions
In many developing countries ¯scal policy is procyclical. Our explanation is
that voters do not trust corrupt government with resources and demand tax
cuts or increase in productive government spending or transfers when posi-
tive shocks hit the economy. Otherwise they fear that the available resources
would be \wasted" in rents. For the same reasons the voters do not \allow"
government to accumulate reserves of assets, on the contrary they demand a
level of government debt that forces the government to use resources to pay
interest rather than steal them. Therefore this political distortion, related to
the \starve the Leviathan"argument, leads to a higher-than-¯rst-best accu-
mulation of government debt and procyclical ¯scal policy.
Credit constraints come into play indirectly because the political distor-
23tion may push the government towards levels of debt that are at the limit of
what they can repay and therefore at the limit of what borrowers can lend.
The literature that focuses on credit constrains reviewed above, implicitly
or explicitly suggests that the \malfunctioning" of credit markets makes it
hard or impossible for developing countries to borrow exactly when they
need it more, in bad times. But this argument fails to explain why welfare
maximizing governments don't take this into account, building up reserves in
good times, so as to avoid being credit constrained in bad times. Moreover,
our evidence suggests that procyclicality is more often driven by a distorted
policy reaction to booms, rather than to recessions. And whatever procycli-
cal policy response there is to recessions, does not seem to be explained by
available measures of credit constraints.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Now consider the case in which the upper bound on rents is a decreasing
function of debt outstanding: Rt = R(bt); with Rb; Rbb < 0: Going through
the same steps as in section 3, in equilibrium the government must be indi®er-
ent between pleasing the voters and being reappointed (taking into account
the future equilibrium continuation value), or grabbing as many rents as pos-
sible today. This indi®erence condition (the analogue of (9) in section 3) here
can be written as:
v(r) + ¯v(R(b
0)) = v(R(b)) (14)
Hence, equilibrium rents are determined jointly with equilibrium gov-
ernment debt. Repeating the steps of Section 3, a government seeking reap-
pointment chooses public debt so as to maximize (11). But here, EV (b0;y0) =





the left hand side of (15) is the marginal bene¯t of borrowing, namely the
additional rents that the government can grab today with the debt proceeds.
The right hand side is the marginal cost of issuing debt, namely the reduction
in the upper bound of rents tomorrow, which in turn reduces the value of
the incumbent's future out-of-equilibrium threat. Together, (9) and (15)
determine the equilibrium time paths of rents and public debt.
24The steady state is obtained imposing b0 = b = b¤ in (14), to yield an ex-




¤))(1 ¡ ¯) (16)
By (16), equilibrium rents are below the upper bound in the steady state:
r¤ < R(b¤). With strictly concave preferences, equation (15) then implies
that the steady state is at an interior optimum (i.e. b¤ < ¹ b) only if Rb(b¤) > 1.
Intuitively, for the government to borrow less than the maximum ¹ b; the cost
of issuing government debt must be high enough. With r¤ < R(b¤), the
marginal utility of current rents is higher than the marginal utility of rents
evaluated at the upper bound; hence the government ¯nds it optimal not to
issue more debt only if the upper bound on rents shrinks more than one for
one as more debt is issued: Rb(b¤) > 1. Assuming that this condition holds
for some b < ¹ b, then the steady state can correspond to an interior optimum
for government debt.
We now show that the steady state is locally stable (i.e. that db0
db < 1
in a neighborhood of the steady state). Equation (15) implicitly de¯nes
equilibrium rents as a function of government debt: r = F(b0). Applying the






Replacing r = F(b0) in (14), the equilibrium law of motion of government
debt is implicitly de¯ned by:
v[F(b
0)] + ¯v[R(b
0)] ¡ v[R(b)] = 0 (18)
Now use (18) to compute db0
db in a neighborhood of the point b0 = b = b¤.







Thus, recalling that Fb(b) < 0, that F(b) < R(b) and that Rbb < 0, and using
(17), we have that db0
db < 1 provided that vrrr ¸ 0 and that Rbb is not too
close to 0 in absolute value.
Finally, note that in equilibrium (on and o® the steady state) neither
rents nor public debt depend on income. The budget constraint then implies
that temporary income shocks change consumption one for one.
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Country  Beta  Initial Year  Final Year 
      
Australia
   0.319 1970 1996 
Austria 0.192  1970  1996 
Belgium 0.120  1970  1996 
Canada
  0.359  1969  1996 
Denmark
  0.840  1970  1996 
Finland
  0.264  1960  1996 
France
  0.401  1972  1996 
Germany -0.086  1991  1996 
Greece 0.136  1960  1996 
Iceland 0.240  1972  1996 
Ireland
  -0.333  1960  1996 
Italy
  0.419  1960  1996 
Japan
  0.278  1960  1993 
Luxembourg -0.267  1975  1996 
Netherlands 0.209  1960  1996 
New Zealand  0.206  1960  1996 
Norway
  0.536  1972  1996 
Portugal 0.425  1975  1996 
Spain 0.265  1962  1996 
Sweden
  0.788  1960  1996 
Switzerland 0.078  1960  1996 
United Kingdom  0.216  1960  1996 
United States
  0.389  1960  1996 
OECD 0.261    
     
Bulgaria 0.432  1988  1997 
Croatia   0.001  1991  1996 
Hungary 0.248  1981  1997 
Romania   0.140  1989  1997 
Turkey   -0.262  1987  1997 
Eastern Europe   0.112       
      
India -0.019  1965  1998 
Indonesia 0.181  1972  1997 
Malaysia -0.003  1960  1997 
Nepal 0.013  1973  1999 
Pakistan 0.095  1973  1998 
Papua New Guinea  -0.094  1975  1993 
Philippines 0.043  1960  1998 
Singapore -0.027  1975  1995 
South Korea  0.002  1972  1996 
Thailand 0.129  1960  1997 
Asia and Pacific  0.032    
      
Egypt -0.028  1975  1997 
Iran 0.145  1974  1990  
Country (continued)  Beta  Initial Year  Final Year 
      
Morocco -0.032  1972  1995 
Tunisia 0.021  1972  1999 
Middle East and North Africa
  0.027    
     
Botswana 0.224  1982  1996 
Burkina Faso  -0.071  1973  1993 
Burundi 0.016  1974  1999 
Cameroon 0.017  1975  1998 
Chad -0.044  1972  1991 
Congo -0.124  1980  1998 
Ethiopia -0.021  1981  1992 
Gabon
  -0.384  1973  1991 
Gambia 0.012  1966  1993 
Ivory Coast
  -0.219  1979  1998 
Madagascar 0.139  1972  1996 
Mali 0.064  1977  1988 
Mauritius
  -0.313  1974  1999 
Namibia -0.243  1986  1993 
Rwanda -0.035  1973  1993 
Senegal 0.035  1972  1984 
Seychelles -0.413  1985  1997 
South Africa  0.133  1972  1998 
Togo -0.739  1977  1987 
Zambia 0.166  1972  1988 
Zimbabwe
  0.280  1976  1996 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.072    
      
Argentina -0.011  1973  1996 
Belize -0.262  1977  1997 
Bolivia 0.278  1980  1997 
Brazil -0.104  1960  1997 
Chile -0.060  1960  1999 
Colombia 0.087  1960  1999 
Costa Rica
  -0.264  1970  1997 
Dominican Republic  0.048  1960  1998 
Ecuador -0.098  1960  1997 
El Salvador  0.023  1960  1999 
Guatemala
  -0.461  1960  1998 
Haiti 0.188  1979  1987 
Honduras 0.033  1960  1997 
Jamaica -0.517  1975  1985 
Mexico -0.094  1971  1997 
Nicaragua -0.145  1960  1996 
Panama
  -0.164  1980  1998 
Paraguay -0.038  1960  1993 
Peru -0.037  1965  1999 
St. Lucia  -0.058  1980  1991 
St. Vincent & Grenadines
  -0.515  1980 1996 Country (continued)  Beta  Initial Year  Final Year 
      
Trinidad & Tobago  -0.801  1976  1995 
Uruguay -0.041  1965  1999 
Venezuela -0.144  1974  1999 
Latin America and Caribbean  -0.132    
     
     
        Regression: ΔSurplust = α + βOutputGapt + γTOTGapt + θSurplust-1 + ɛt 
 Table 2 
Beta Coefficients – Expenditures and Revenues 
Country  Beta (exp.)  Beta (rev.) 
    
Australia -0.105  0.104 
Austria 0.256  0.260 
Belgium -0.488  -0.314 
Canada -0.136  0.173 
Denmark -0.469  0.354 
Finland -0.285  -0.071 
France -0.267  0.034 
Greece 0.107  -0.067 
Iceland 0.105  0.182 
Ireland 0.137  -0.193 
Italy -0.322  -0.022 
Japan 0.154  0.612 
Luxembourg -0.643  -0.578 
Netherlands -0.528  -0.263 
Norway -0.299  0.371 
Portugal 0.195  0.167 
Spain -0.217  -0.127 
Sweden -0.760  0.635 
Switzerland -0.166  -0.071 
United Kingdom  -0.803  -0.304 
United States  -0.270  0.098 
OECD -0.229  0.047 
    
Bulgaria 0.544  0.561 
Croatia 0.002  0.003 
Hungary -0.155  0.207 
Romania -0.560  0.158 
Turkey 0.316  -0.015 
Eastern Europe
  0.029 0.183 
    
India   -0.029  0.077 
Indonesia   -0.119  0.029 
Malaysia   -0.022  0.174 
Nepal   0.005  0.025 
Pakistan   0.270  0.108 
Singapore   -0.163  0.245 
South Korea   0.013  0.089 
Thailand   -0.092  0.231 
Asia and Pacific  -0.017  0.122 
    
Egypt -0.116  0.014 
Iran 0.004  0.050 
Morocco -0.157  -0.050 
Tunisia 0.003  -0.008 
Middle East and North Africa  -0.066  0.001  
Country  Beta (exp.)  Beta (rev.) 
    
Burkina Faso  -0.039  -0.106 
Burundi 0.159  0.061 
Cameroon 0.108  0.078 
Chad -0.333  -0.078 
Congo 0.878  0.152 
Ethiopia 0.252  0.172 
Gabon 0.200  -0.022 
Gambia 0.495  0.154 
Ivory Coast  0.105  -0.205 
Madagascar -0.161  0.090 
Mali -0.321  -0.090 
Mauritius 0.136  -0.047 
Namibia 0.517  0.172 
Rwanda -0.115  0.012 
Senegal -0.180  -0.008 
Seychelles 0.517  -0.063 
South Africa  -0.027  0.022 
Togo 0.516  0.275 
Zambia 0.044  0.243 
Zimbabwe -0.122  0.005 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.132  0.041 
    
Argentina 0.016  0.015 
Belize 0.179  -0.142 
Bolivia 0.389  -0.315 
Brazil 0.265  0.161 
Chile 0.037  0.047 
Colombia -0.211  -0.088 
Costa Rica  0.206  0.010 
Dominica 3.270  0.061 
Dominican Republic  0.056  0.033 
Guatemala 0.553  0.080 
Haiti 0.155  -0.196 
Honduras -0.424  -0.084 
Jamaica -0.199  -0.323 
Mexico -0.086  -0.121 
Nicaragua 0.073  -0.035 
Panama 0.203  0.116 
Paraguay 0.033  -0.002 
Peru -0.081  -0.092 
St. Lucia  -0.104  -0.094 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.482  0.143 
Uruguay 0.265  -0.036 
Venezuela 0.141  -0.073 
Latin America and Caribbean  0.093  -0.047 
        





Beta Coefficients and Control of Corruption 
Region  Beta  Beta (exp.)  Beta (rev.)  Control of Corruption 
        
OECD 0.261  -0.229  0.047  1.813 
Eastern Europe  0.112  0.029  0.183  -0.056 
Asia and Pacific  0.032  -0.017  0.122  -0.008 
Middle East and North Africa  0.027
* -0.133  -0.038  -0.073 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.072  0.132  0.041  -0.339 
Latin America and Caribbean  -0.132  0.093  -0.047  -0.237 
        








OLS Estimates: cyclicality of budget surplus 
(Dependent variable: Beta of budget surplus) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Control of Corruption 
 
 






































- 0.049   
(0.039) 
 






- 0.059   
(0.041) 
 

























**   
(0.036) 
 






























Robust standard errors in parenthesis; intercepts not reported. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
  
Table 5 
Probit Estimates: cyclicality of budget surplus 
(Dependent variable: Probability of Beta>0) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Control of Corruption 
 
 






































- 0.290   
(0.245) 
 
0.139    
(0.371) 
 
- 0.288  
(0.388) 
 
- 0.352   
(0.248) 
 



































Robust standard errors in parenthesis; intercepts not reported. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 




Weighted Estimates: cyclicality of budget surplus 
(Dependent variable: Beta of budget surplus) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Control of Corruption 
 
 






































- 0.037   
(0.033) 
 






- 0.050   
(0.033) 
 



































Robust standard errors in parenthesis; intercepts not reported. The weights are the inverse of the standard errors of 
the estimated beta coefficients. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
 
 Table 7 
OLS Estimates: cyclicality of government spending 
(Dependent variable: Beta on central government spending) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Control of Corruption 
 
 

























































































Robust standard errors in parenthesis; intercepts not reported. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
 
 Table 8 
Partial correlation coefficients 
  Beta (surp.)  Beta (exp.) 
Control of 
Corruption  S&P Rating  Spread 
Beta  (surp.)  1       
Beta  (exp.)  -0.50  1     
Control of Corruption  0.26  -0.39  1     
S&P Rating  0.40  -0.45  0.92  1   







Beta Coefficients (budget surplus)– pre- and post-1982 
Country  Beta pre-82  Beta post-82 
    
Australia 0.015  0.662 
Austria 0.135  0.188 
Belgium 0.469  -0.320 
Canada 0.635  0.174 
Denmark 0.379  1.539 
Finland 0.056  0.731 
France 0.437  0.243 
Germany -  -0.086 
Greece 0.086  -0.896 
Iceland 0.329  0.339 
Ireland -0.361  -0.037 
Italy 0.478  0.086 
Japan 0.216  1.232 
Luxembourg 0.335  -0.473 
Netherlands 0.110  0.147 
New Zealand  0.023  0.538 
Norway -0.054  0.787 
Portugal -0.081  0.332 
Spain 0.139  1.075 
Sweden 0.009  2.128 
Switzerland 0.048  0.204 
United Kingdom  -0.099  0.589 
United States  0.426  0.169 
OECD 0.170  0.407 
(excluding Denmark, Sweden)    0.271 
    
India -0.027  -0.111 
Indonesia 0.002  0.292 
Malaysia -0.270  0.101 
Nepal -0.062  0.552 
Pakistan 0.900  -0.045 
Papua New Guinea  -0.152  -0.152 
Philippines -0.226  0.100 
Singapore 0.569  0.080 South Korea  0.181  -0.035 
Thailand 0.043  0.163 
Asia and Pacific  0.096  0.095 
     
Bulgaria -  0.432 
Croatia -  0.001 
Hungary -  0.254 
Romania -  0.140 
Turkey -  -0.262 
Eastern Europe
  - 0.113 
    
Country (continued) Beta  pre-82  Beta post-82 
     
Egypt 1.435  -1.135 
Iran -0.093  0.497 
Morocco -0.409  -0.005 
Tunisia 0.203  0.110 
Middle East and North Africa  0.284  -0.133 
    
Botswana -  0.329 
Burkina Faso  -0.221  0.048 
Burundi -0.214  0.082 
Cameroon -0.020  0.045 
Chad -  -0.223 
Congo -  -0.476 
Ethiopia -  -0.028 
Gabon -0.594  -0.157 
Gambia -0.034  - 
Ivory Coast  -  -0.098 
Madagascar -  0.232 
Mali 0.338  -0.015 
Mauritius -0.160  -0.058 
Namibia -  -0.243 
Rwanda -0.014  - 
Senegal -0.180  - 
Seychelles -  -0.413 
South Africa  -0.350  0.525 
Togo -1.808  -0.274 Zambia 0.163  2.539 
Zimbabwe 1.087  0.204 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.154  0.112 
(excluding Zambia)    -0.031 
    
Argentina -0.140  0.079 
Belize -  -0.345 
Bolivia -  1.210 
Brazil 0.005  -0.343 
Chile -0.100  0.235 
Colombia -0.163  0.334 
Costa Rica  -0.374  -0.206 
Dominican Republic  -0.035  -0.004 
Ecuador 0.005  0.041 
El Salvador  -0.109  0.097 
Guatemala -0.651  -0.064 
Haiti -  3.293 
Honduras -0.019  0.356 
Jamaica 0.248  - 
Mexico -0.218  0.047  
Country (continued)  Beta pre-82  Beta post-82 
    
Nicaragua -0.123  -0.280 
Panama -  -0.100 
Paraguay -0.054  0.174 
Peru -0.168  0.032 
St. Lucia  -  -0.442 
St. Vicent & Grenadines  -  -0.535 
Trinidad & Tobago  -1.350  - 
Uruguay 0.010  0.013 
Venezuela -0.428  -0.020 
Latin America and Caribbean  -0.204  0.162 
 (excluding Haiti)     0.013 
    “Excluded” countries are those with a coefficient with absolute value greater than 1.500. 
 
 
 Table 10 
OLS estimates: cyclicality of budget surplus (Pre-1982) 
(Dependent variable: Beta on budget surplus, Pre-1982) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Control of Corruption 
 
 






































- 0.089   
(0.079) 
 







- 0.079   
(0.080) 
 
- 0.075    
(0.126) 
 


































- 0.005    
(0.011) 
 
















Robust standard errors in parenthesis; intercepts not reported. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
                                                                                                              Table 11  
OLS estimates with S&P Ratings and Spread as additional regressors 
(Dependent variable: Beta on budget surplus) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Control of Corruption 
 
 






































- 0.016    
(0.058) 
 









































- 0.004   
(0.007) 
 














































































































































Robust standard errors in parenthesis; intercepts not reported. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 




Table 12  
“Recession” and “Boom” Coefficients for Procyclical Countries 
 
Country Beta  Recession  Beta  Boom 
    
Argentina -  0.175  0.173 
Belize -  0.183  -  0.530 
Brazil 0.444  -  0.603 
Burkina Faso  0.500  - 0.472 
Chad 0.733  -  0.376 
Chile -  0.019  -  0.095 
Congo 0.660  -  0.430 
Costa Rica  0.140  - 0.878 
Ecuador 0.120  -  0.388 
Egypt 0.843  -  0.434 
Ethiopia 0.145  -  0.392 
Gabon -  0.208  -  0.397 
Germany 0.150  -  0.165 
Guatemala -  0.200  -  0.791 
India 0.025  -  0.126 
Ireland -  0.384  -  0.259 
Ivory Coast  0.107  - 0.554 
Jamaica -  1.354  2.478 
Luxembourg -  0.087  -  0.659 
Malaysia -  0.148  0.174 
Mauritius -  0.461  -  0.263 
Mexico -  0.071  -  0.128 
Morocco 0.053  -  0.093 
Namibia 0.408  -  1.161 
Nicaragua -  0.027  -  0.316 
Panama -  0.023  -  0.645 
Papua New Guinea  0.016  - 0.274 
Paraguay 0.040  -  0.078 
Peru 0.254  -  0.242 
Rwanda -  0.037  -  0.033 
Seychelles 1.650  -  4.790 
Singapore 0.355  -  0.607 
St. Lucia  0.034  - 0.122 
St. Vicent & Grenadines  - 0.814  - 0.223 
Togo 0.549  -  1.503 
Trinidad & Tobago  - 2.962  - 0.277 
Turkey -  0.473  -  0.031 
Uruguay -  0.088  -  0.014 
Venezuela -  0.421  0.186 
        








Corruption and credit constraints in recessions: dependent variable is the beta 






(Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Intercepts not shown.) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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